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MR. KEYTE: Everybody knows Eleanor Fox, who
is an iconic figure in antitrust.
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topic and panel that she will lead.

I really look

forward to it.
PROF. FOX:
everyone.

Hello.

Good morning to

Welcome to the panel on Populism and

Antitrust.

Thank you very much, James.

For this segment of the program we have a
most amazing group of speakers, none of whom need
introduction, but I’ll give a very short one for each
of them, and then we will talk for just a minute about
what is the populism problem, if there is one, and
then turn to our panelists for what will be very short
initial interventions.

After that, we will have a

panel discussion, and then we will definitely leave
time for you to ask your questions or give your
comments.
For the panel members I will start with my
immediate right.
Herb Hovenkamp is the James G. Diamond
University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School and the Wharton School at the University of
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Pennsylvania.

He is often called “the dean of

American antitrust law.”

He is co-author, with Philip

Areeda and Donald Turner, of the most famous, wellregarded U.S. antitrust treatise, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application.

He writes extraordinarily widely in the

field.
To his right is Frédéric Jenny.

Frédéric is

Professor of Economics at ESSEC Business School in
Paris.

He is what I call “the chairman of

international antitrust,” meaning in particular he is
of course the Chairman of the OECD Competition
Committee.

He was the Chairman of the WTO Working

Group on Trade and Competition.

He was a member of

the French Supreme Court, Economic and Commercial
Chamber, the first and only economist to be a member
of that court; was Vice Chair of the French
Competition Authority; and is from time to time my
colleague at New York University as Global Hauser
Scholar.
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To his right is Joseph Stiglitz, who is a
university professor at Columbia University and a
Nobel Prize winner in Economic Science.

He was Chief

Economist of the World Bank, and he was Chairman of
the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers.

One of his

very famous books is Globalization and Its
Discontents, which I think raised the consciousness of
the world about the discontents of globalization.
To Joe’s right is Mario Monti.
very happy to welcome you back.

Mario, we’re

You know Mario at

least from the time when he was Commissioner at the
European Commission, first in DG Internal Market and
then in DG Competition.

He is President of the

Bocconi University in Milan.
in Italy.

He is a Lifetime Senator

He was called upon, as Silvio Berlusconi

was stepping down as Prime Minister of Italy and Italy
was in great financial crisis and turmoil, to pull
Italy out of the turmoil; he was Prime Minister of
Italy.
That is our wonderful stellar cast.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

5

To kick off this session, Joe, I’m going to
quote from you in your article “America Has a Monopoly
Problem — and It’s Huge.”
“There is much to be concerned about in
America today: a growing political and economic
divide, slowing growth, decreasing life expectancy, an
epidemic of diseases of despair.

The unhappiness that

is apparent has taken an ugly turn, with an increase
in protectionism and nativism. ... There is a
widespread sense of powerlessness, both in our
economic and political life.

We seem no longer to

control our own destinies.”
In this article Professor Stiglitz goes on
to say that the U.S. antitrust laws were based upon a
concern that “concentrations of economic power
inevitably would lead to concentrations in political
power. ... It was really about the nature of our
society and democracy.”
This is the subject of our panel today: Is
there a huge problem that we should be concerned about
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and do something about — and, of course, since we are
antitrust people, we are asking the question
specifically in the context of antitrust; or is the
populist outcry simply false complaints by people who
don’t understand that they are helped by trade and
competition; we should try to teach them the truth,
but if they can’t understand it is too bad for them?
That is the question.
We are going to start out with Frédéric.
Frédéric, would you say a few words to put this all in
context?

Is there a problem?

How has it emerged?

What is the problem?

Of course, you don’t have very

many minutes for your first intervention, but to the
extent you wish, is there a solution and what is the
solution?

We’ll come back to solutions later.
PROF. JENNY: Thank you very much, Eleanor,

and thank you very much to Fordham for inviting me to
be on this panel.
I would like to address the issue of the
crumbling consensus on liberal market policies from
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the point of view of the relationship between policy
and what I see as economic theory.
To be technical and not political, I see
that there are areas where there have been either a
misuse or an ignorance of economic theory, which may
explain why it is that we see that more and more
people both in Europe and in the United States feel
that the elite is corrupt or pushing policies that are
for the self-benefit of the elite and not really for
the benefit of the people, which is one of the
definitions of what populism is.
Let me start with a very well-known theorem,
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in international trade,
which basically says that when a country trades, and
if they don’t completely specialize, the factor which
is the scarcer in one country is going to suffer
because of the competition from the other country and
because that factor is more abundant in the other
country.
Now, what that means is that in the process
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of globalization there are going to be people who are
going to be displaced.

When one hears about

globalization, about trade liberalization, it is very
seldom that a public policymaker ever mentions the
fact that in the process there are going to be people
who are going to lose out.
If you look at the United States and Europe,
and if you look at the factors in a rather aggregated
way, we have comparatively more capital than many
other countries that we trade with, we have
comparatively more skilled people than many other
countries, but we have comparatively fewer unskilled
people, and they are, according to the theorem,
precisely the people who are going to be hurt.
we mention that?

Should

Should we plan when we push the idea

of free trade, which is certainly a positive in
general, but should we allow for the fact that some
people are going to be displaced?
The basic answer that I find both in trade
theory and also in competition law is that we don’t
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need to worry about them because there is a process of
reallocation of resources.

So, some of the firms are

going to go out of business but the capital and the
labor are going to be recycled elsewhere, and because
you have a very large labor market, people will find
another job elsewhere.
This I think is a misuse of economic theory,
because we in fact know that labor markets are not
very deep, are not very competitive, and are not very
flexible.

There are plenty of reasons why,

particularly for the people who are displaced because
of competition — I am talking about the low-skill
workers — are going to have a lot of difficulty
reallocating themselves in activities that are a
better fit for the environment.
Some of those have to do with the fact that
everybody has a family, there are several people
working in the family, and it is not all that easy to
pack up and go where there is another job.
geographical mobility may not be very high.
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own houses, and very often when they are in industries
that are depleted because of competition the value of
their houses goes down, the value of lodging in places
where there are jobs is very high, so that creates a
second type of problem.
And in many countries — certainly in Europe
but from what I’ve read also in the United States —
the programs to retool people, to give them new
skills, the skills that could be usable when they
start from a low level of skills, are not terribly
effective.

They are not terribly effective, among

other things, because of the digital revolution and
the things that we have heard about the evolution of
technology.
Therefore, the labor market is in fact very
fragmented and there is a lot of immobility or lack of
flexibility, as a result of which the people who are
going to be directly hit by competition or
international competition are not going to be able to
react or to find another job.
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It’s quite striking to look at the data for
the United States on people who migrate to find a job.
There have been statistics since 1999 in the United
States, and you see that the number of people who
migrate to find a better job has oscillated between
2.8 million and 4.5 million, but there is a continuing
decrease in the trend, even though the U.S. population
has increased by more than 20 percent during that
time.

So clearly the lack of flexibility becomes even

more pronounced now for some of the reasons I have
mentioned.
Now, should we ignore that?

What we do when

we talk about competition is we assume that there is
not going to be any labor effect of competition, so
therefore the only effect is going to be — I don’t
know — lower prices, better quality, so that is going
to work.

But, in reality, when people are displaced

at the same time, certainly the system does not
necessarily work very well for them.
The third dimension, and the last one, which
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I want to mention, which I think is important and has
been consistently ignored in the area of competition,
in spite of the fact that two eminent economists got
the Nobel Prize in the last fifteen years for this, is
the teachings of behavioral economics.
We work on the assumption that the
satisfaction, the welfare, of people is directly
linked to what they can consume or what they choose to
consume, goods and services.
If we look at what Daniel Kahneman and
Richard Thaler tell us, they say basically there is
another argument in the utility function of people,
which is some concept of fairness.
Now, fairness is a big vague; there are
dimensions of fairness — horizontal fairness, vertical
fairness, procedural fairness — but it’s quite clear
that people are willing to trade off some physical
welfare coming from the goods and services that they
have for a fairer system, or a system where they have
the feeling that it is more fair.
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When you put all those things together, you
end up with the idea that we have a system where we
promote competition which would be fine if there was
no labor implication of competition, but which is not
fine when there are labor implications because there
is a large segment of the population for which the
mechanism will mean that maybe they will have lower
prices and new products, but also they will either no
job or a job which is paying much less than they had
before, and therefore it is not clear to them that
their welfare has increased.

We don’t talk about it.

We don’t do much about it.
I will finish with one thing, which is a
very interesting set of studies that has been done by
the Bruegel Research Institute in Europe looking at a
very disaggregated level at the votes for Trump in the
United States and for Brexit in the United Kingdom.
What is absolutely clear is that the correlation
between the proportion of votes for what I would call,
in a very rapid and probably simplistic way, some kind
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of populism is directly linked to (a) the Gini
coefficient of inequality and (b) poverty, and those
two themselves are correlated together.
So, from one place to another it has nothing
much to do with immigration, a very weak relationship
with immigration, but a very high relationship with
inequality.
We do have a system of competition where
capital is very mobile, so no problem either
nationally or internationally to get other
opportunities.

A segment of the population is hurt by

it, with no realistic prospect to find a better job or
to find a job that pays as much even though they work
as hard, because of policies that have in fact
implicitly chosen to sacrifice them for other
benefits.
If we don’t deal with this issue — and we’ll
see when we come to the remedies — it means that there
is a segment of the population that is going to be
hurt and another segment of the population that thinks
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that the system is unfair.

I think that’s the heart

of the problem.
PROF. FOX:

Great.

Thank you.

That was a very interesting presentation of
why people feel that they are left out of the system
and it doesn’t work for them.
Joe, could you amplify and give us a larger
picture on the question: is there an economic problem?
Does America really have a monopoly problem, what is
it, and how related to it is competition and
competition law?
PROF. STIGLITZ:

First, let me just make a

couple of brief comments in the beginning.
I don’t like the word “populism.”
society is supposed to help ordinary people.

Our
I would

rather talk about antiestablishment — in the Brexit
vote, and it was very clear in both the United States
and in Europe in the Le Pen vote in France.
The second point is that you said that
policymakers had misused theory.
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the Council of Economic Advisers.

We pointed out to

the administration that freeing trade, the StolperSamuelson Theorem — every economist knows that — and
that it would in the best of worlds lead to more
inequality if markets worked well, and if markets
didn’t work well it would actually lead to increased
unemployment.
It was why many of us said that you can’t
just take down trade barriers, that you also have to
accompany that by other policies, trade assistance;
and that if you didn’t do that, you would be betraying
the workers of America, making our society not only
more unequal but actually less efficient, because if
you were basically throwing out large fractions of the
labor force out of the labor market, you are actually
destroying American efficiency.
I think you have to see what happened in
terms of the politics of power, that there were some
groups who benefitted a lot from globalization and
they didn’t want to share the benefits with those who
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were being hurt.

It was a distributive battle in

which some people won and some people lost.

So it

wasn’t just lack of knowledge, it was a real battle.
You see it even worse in the investment
agreements, which give more property rights to, say,
American firms investing abroad than they have here in
the United States in terms of issues of regulatory
takings.

Therefore, we actually shaped our trade laws

to weaken the bargaining power of workers.
The reason all this is relevant is I do
think we have a monopoly problem.

It’s not only a

monopoly problem; it’s a problem of imbalance of
market power.
The competitive model that has sort of
framed a lot of thinking about antitrust is now pretty
discredited in economics, and anybody who relies on
that is really using a model that just doesn’t
describe a 20 percent economy.

Lots of evidence of

this in terms of the distribution of income cannot be
explained within a competitive model.
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what are called rents that can’t be explained by
either return to labor or return to capital has gone
way up.

While there is some dispute about this, I

think there is a broad consensus that there has been a
significant increase in rents.
The explanation for it is somewhat — to what
extent is it technology, market structure,
anticompetitive practices, lack of enforcement of
antitrust laws, innovation in creating new
anticompetitive practices — Microsoft we talked about
in the first session and Google, but there are other
companies that are at the frontier of innovating and
developing new anticompetitive practices.
The way to understand what is going on is to
see that the competitive model which has been the
framework for antitrust is really not a good way of
understanding the economy.
What is particularly important is what
Frédéric emphasized, the lack of competition in labor
markets.

If you talk to labor economists and you talk
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about competitive markets, they laugh at you.

The

work of, for instance, David Card and Alan Krueger
about what would happen if you raised the minimum wage
— standard theory says it should have large effects on
unemployment; it doesn’t.

But there are lots of other

studies that have now been done that make it very
clear that labor markets are not well-described.
Let me put it more broadly.

Markets don’t

exist in a vacuum; they are shaped by our laws.
laws on competition shape product markets.
laws shape what goes on in labor markets.

Our

Our labor
There has

been a change in the nature of those laws which has
disempowered workers, in particular vis-à-vis
corporations.
As a result, you have these two effects
going on at the same time: weakening market power of
workers, partly because of trade policy but also
because of changes in the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) regulations and so forth, and a recent
Supreme Court decision; and, on the other hand, an
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increase in market power for a whole variety of
reasons.
All of this relates to what Eleanor said in
the beginning.

If we could go back to the origins of

antitrust, it didn’t have to do with economists
worrying about distortions in a competitive
equilibrium model.

That was not what Teddy Roosevelt

was talking about.

The model wasn’t even formulated

at that point.

It wasn’t fine-tuning to make sure a

competitive market really worked better; it was about
political and economic power and the effect economic
power was having on our political system.
I think that we are at a similar juncture
today: a sense that there is inequality, that many of
the reasons for this inequality have to do with the
way the rules have been formulated; the way the rules
have been formulated has to do with our political
system; the political system is affected by money; and
money is affected by monopoly power on the one hand
and lack of effective power on the part of workers.
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Once you see it this way, you begin to
understand why the standard arguments — just focusing
on, for instance, consumer welfare — do not have
purchase.

So, for instance, if a worker has no job,

the fact that goods are a little cheaper doesn’t make
him feel very good.

He has no purchasing power, so a

little cheaper doesn’t make any difference.

That’s in

the context of trade theory.
But if the exercise of monopsony power leads
to lower wages in the labor market and that is passed
on partly to consumers, it’s still not a good thing.
It’s a distortion in our economy.

The fact is that

the consumer has been a little bit better off but the
bulk of the benefits went to the corporation is a sign
that something is wrong.
Some of our big companies have clearly
market power, and the fact that they can share that
with their customers isn’t a statement that the system
is functioning well.

In some areas, like finance and

banking, large banks have a further advantage because
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of the implicit guarantee of “too big to fail,” and so
you can get large not because you are more efficient,
but because you are taking advantage of these other
things, like “too big to fail,” monopsony power.
So the usual concern: We are not against
size, but we are against size when it arises from
abuse, anticompetitive practices on the one hand and
the use of market power on the other.
Now, let me just talk about the
pervasiveness of market power is actually having many
of us believe macroeconomic effects.

One of the

startling things about the U.S. economy today — and to
a lesser extent in Europe — is that profits are
reaching as a share of GDP an all-time high, and yet
investment is not.
Normally, in a normal model, you would have
thought “If things are so profitable, why aren’t they
investing?”

The simple answer: If there is lack of

competition, there is a discrepancy between the
marginal return on investment and the average return;
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and the more market power, the greater that
discrepancy is.

Thus, you can have high profits and

yet low marginal returns and low investments, and
there is an increasing understanding that this may be
one of the reasons for the weaknesses in our overall
growth performance.
I want to make very briefly two more points.
When you recognize the pervasiveness of
market power, it also affects a variety of other ways
in which you look at issues of competition policy.
Traditionally, there has been a lot of focus mostly on
horizontal mergers.

In the presence of lots of

pockets of imperfect competition, vertical mergers can
also have severe anticompetitive effects.

In some

sense, in a general equilibrium model you may not even
need to distinguish between horizontal and vertical;
those are just ways of organizing what is going on.
But a merger can increase market power, and that
should be really the test that you want to apply.
The second point I want to make, a final
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point, is that there has been a lot of innovation in
exercise of market power and there have been changes
in the structure of our economy, and in both areas I’m
not sure that antitrust has kept up with what needs to
be done.

On one hand, the issues raised by artificial

intelligence and access to big data and the use of
data seems to me an issue that will be important going
forward.
The second one is the two-sided markets.

I

gather you had a discussion yesterday of some of the
two-sided market issues.

It is clear in my view that

the Supreme Court got it wrong.

Whether in those

particular cases there was a two-sided market, how you
think about two-sided markets is clearly more complex
than the Supreme Court understood.

The contract

provisions, which short-circuit use of the price
system, is an example of what I think of as an
anticompetitive practice which takes what would be a
market power that arises out of network externalities
and amplifies the consequences of it.
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So that as we have, as was discussed in the
previous session, network externalities, some
technological changes, we have to be even more
cautious about the innovation in anticompetitive
practices that we have been seeing.
PROF. FOX:

Thank you.

That was provocative

on so many points, and we’ll pick up on your
provocations at the panel discussion.
At this moment we’re going to turn to Mario
Monti.

Mario, could you say some words about both

political populism, especially as related to Europe,
and its relationship to markets and competition?
PROF. MONTI:

I’ll try.

The curious aspect to that is that populism
and competition policy have a semantic but also
substantial point in common — that is, trust.

Here we

are dealing with a triangle which has populism
generating and linked to a huge mistrust in society
and in institutions.
Competition policy is of course to a large
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extent antitrust, and our problem is: can antitrust
help in turning back into trust a situation of
mistrust which plagues our economies and societies
now?
Looking at this particularly from the
perspective of Europe, I would wish to say first of
all that the Europe Union is in my view more
vulnerable than other countries or jurisdictions to
populism.
Why?

Because populism has common aspects

wherever it manifests itself, but when it manifests
itself in an integrated system of countries, then
populism can be a powerful factor for disintegration
because populism generates, and is in turn generated
by, mistrust in politics, in political institutions,
in the elites, and the narrowing of the horizon of
national political decision-making that goes with
populism.
That is, a shorter and shorter time horizon
and narrower and narrower geographical scope of
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decision-making in politics when populism prevails has
the consequence that the first victim of populism is
integration, is international integration generally.
We can see that in the last few years both at the
global level within the WTO, in individual countries,
but above all in an articulated system of countries
like the European Union.
In Europe, of course, competition policy
(antitrust) was historically brought about by European
integration, exactly the reverse of what we have seen
more recently concerning monetary policy.

There we

had national central banks in Europe, and then much
more recently the emergence of a system comprised
centrally of the European Central Bank and of the
national central banks.
If we go back to the history of competition
policy in Europe, we see competition born in 1958 in
Germany and in the European Union, whereas there were
no competition laws or competition authorities in any
other country in Europe.
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American influence, by the way, the creation in
Germany and in the European Union of competition
policy and laws.
To the extent that the advent of populism
may weaken the progress of European integration, may
bring some aspects of disintegration, this may weaken
the vector of competition policy into the European
system as a whole.
Populism in its extreme forms in Europe may
even lead to the bringing down of the European Union.
I do not believe that populism in the United States,
for the time being at least, is susceptible of
bringing down — maybe some actions by the American
President may contribute to some U.S. disintegration,
so far more forcefully than he has contributed to the
declared objective of favoring European
disintegration.

At any rate, a weakening of the

European Union in Europe would mean a weakening of
competition policy, whereas populism can hardly bring
about this in the United States.
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Now, it is amazing how late, how slow, the
political system in Europe has been in recognizing the
phenomenon of populism, which is now a number-one
phenomenon.

If you ask somebody about what is the

main concern about the elections for the European
Parliament next May, most European governments will
tell you that is populism.
But I want to give you simply an anecdote
that tells us how blind Europe’s politicians were to
the emergence of populism.

That has been visible for

ten years already.
In 2012, in my brief time as Prime Minister
of Italy, and therefore a participant in the European
Council where the heads of government sit, I was
impressed by the total lack of any political
discussion on Europe.

All the time went to the Greek

crisis and similar topics, nothing to the first signs,
which were very visible already, of populism and what
implications that may have for the process of European
integration.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

30

I proposed to the President of the European
Council, Herman Van Rompuy, to hold one specific
session of that Council for a political discussion on
this emerging populism and nationalism.
“What a great idea.

He said,

We will do that.”

Two days later, one of the most forwardlooking European politicians, Chancellor Merkel,
kindly called me and she said, “Herman told me of your
idea of having a discussion on populism.

I think it’s

a good idea, but I think it would be more appropriate
if we delay this discussion until the complete
solution of the Greek crisis is achieved.”
They haven’t had this discussion yet,
although populism —
PROF. STIGLITZ:

Or the crisis isn’t

resolved.
PROF. MONTI:

No.

Well, this says something about European
governance, but also about the delay in perception.
If you are inside, then you should be more interested
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than ever about this phenomenon.
My last but one point I would like to make
is about inequalities.

We all know that populism has

been fed largely by inequalities.

And here in the

case of the European Union the process of European
integration has been biased, we must recognize,
because the strong weapons in the hands of the
integrator — i.e. the European Commission — have been
the policies on the Single Market and the policies on
competition, whereas policies which could have
accompanied integration with actions to take care of
the temporary losers from integration remain largely
in national hands, fiscal policy in particular.

It is

a valid criticism that the process of market
integration in Europe has brought about greater
inequalities in favor of capital and companies and
against labor, particularly the non-qualified labor.
But it is interesting to note that although
it is extremely difficult to make progress in tax
coordination — because of the unanimity requirement in
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the Council, all Member States have a veto — and tax
coordination is needed if we want that market
integration does not bring about this negative side
effect of bias in the distributional income against
labor.
Nevertheless, there is one exception of an
area that we can call taxation, which is comprised in
the European definition of competition policy.

You

know that the main difference between the European
Union and the rest of the world is that in the
European Union, because of its supranational nature,
competition policy comprises also state aid control.
One of the feeders of populism is the perception —
real or not real — that the rich, the big, have a
greater easiness in evading and eluding taxes.
The European Commission has gradually built
a doctrine, which has been upheld by the European
Court, that some state aids taking the form of tax
privileges incur into the rules on state aids.
Therefore, a major case, like the case two years ago
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of the European Commission asking the Irish government
to ask back of Apple some €13 billion euros of tax
advantages may help a lot tackle one of the issues
which are the basis of populism.

Here I think there

is a potential for the European Commission to act even
more.
Last, a quick point on the digital
platforms.

We all look with enormous interest — and

this morning in the previous presentations that was an
important part — to the application of competition
policy and antitrust to big tech and the digital
platforms.
For a number of reasons, the European
competition policy being rather more solid, certainly
less politically cyclical, than competition policy is
in the United States, can be expected — and maybe is
already — to display greater incisiveness in this new
area as well.
Here there are two sentences in one of the
recent speeches by George Soros.
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actions of Commissioner Vestager in this area.

He

says: “In the US, the regulators are not strong enough
to stand up against [the big tech companies’]
political influence.

The European Union is better

situated because it doesn’t have any platform giants
of its own.” 1
In this asymmetry I see a very central point
of concern for the next few years.

We know that —

even more generally, look at the Data Protection
Regulation — the European Union becomes more and more
specialized in regulation.

Unfortunately for Europe,

it is not equally strong in developing within Europe
digital platforms.

But if the European Union is to

conduct its competition enforcement vigorously, it
will statistically hit much more than proportionately
companies that are based in the United States.

We

here all know that there is no industrial policy, no
protectionist, tilt to that, but it will should be
watched very, very carefully.

George Soros, “The Current Moment in History,” Remarks Before the World Economic Forum,
Davos, Switzerland (Jan. 25, 2018), available at
1
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In the limit, suppose that measures to cope
with the excessive market power of these digital
platforms may require breakups.

Can we imagine the

European competition authority has permission to make
such a decision concerning a U.S.-based digital
platform?

I think this would pose very interesting

problems.
We saw what could be called a virtual
breakup, namely the non-authorization of a merger that
had been already authorized in the United States,
GE/Honeywell, creating remarkable shocks.

I think it

will be politically extremely problematic to have
structural remedies in this industry unless a new,
very high consensus is developed, first of all, in
this family about how to proceed about that without
any suspicion of protectionist or industrial policy
elements.
PROF. FOX:

Thank you, Mario, for those very

provocative remarks.

https://www.georgesoros.com/2018/01/25/remarks-delivered-at-the-world-economic-forum/
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As you will have observed, we are taking on
two elements that may seem disparate.

One is

political populism. Extreme political parties have
been winning elections all over the world. They may
take nativist political positions and their systems
may lack due process and lack rule of law. They are
fueled by sentiments that underlie antitrust populism
– discontent with growing inequalities, a feeling of
being left out, believing that the system works for
elites and not for the people.
Herb, I am going to ask you to take us back
to a narrower internal-to-competition debate.

How

does populism — or, as Joe says, anti-elitism, antiestablishmentism — how does that play into competition
law?

The panel has raised real concerns. But do they

relate to competition law and should we bring them
into competition law?
PROF. HOVENKAMP:

Thank you.

I’m here as an American antitrust moderate,
and so far the populists haven’t pushed me off that
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point, and that’s the perspective I’ll speak from.
I believe in the consumer welfare principle.
I believe it needs some tinkering, but I’m not
deterred that it was a bad idea.
First of all, I think one of the things we
need to hope for at this point is a soft landing.
Populism comes and goes.

I think it is practically

unquestionable that there are going to be effects of
this populist movement and that the problems that the
other panel members have identified are very real.

I

think the worst thing antitrust can do is stick its
head in the sand, like the proverbial ostrich, and
pretend like they are not there.
Now, we had one experience which did
produce, I believe, a soft landing, and that was the
transition from the Sherman Act in 1890 to the Clayton
Act in 1914.

The Sherman Act was very much a

populist-driven measure.

It was quite agrarian,

fairly rural, and quite anti-intellectual.
However, over the next twenty-five years the
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rise of progressivism became more urban, more
educated, and the result of course was not
nationalization of the railroads, as some people in
the Gilded Age proposed, or some other form of
socialism.
Rather, it was a set of provisions that were
more explicit about what they covered.

They continued

to use economic language “where the effect may be
substantially to lessen competition or create a
monopoly.”

They created an effects test in all of the

substantive provisions of the Clayton Act that more or
less invited economic analysis in.
Antitrust took a somewhat more aggressive
turn in the wake of the Clayton Act, as it should
have, but it didn’t throw American’s mixed capitalist
economy off the rails.

I think that’s a worthwhile

thing to keep in mind.
The other thing to keep in mind is that
among the various economic problems we have been
talking about this morning antitrust is not by any
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means the only fix.

Yes, wages are too low, wages are

stagnating, there’s a growing maldistribution of
wealth in the country.

Those are all problems that

need to be addressed.
But antitrust is not the exclusive, nor even
the predominant, tool for doing many of those things.
And here, particularly in the case of U.S. antitrust
law, we have a set of provisions that are enforced
very heavily by private plaintiffs, and if damages are
being sought, as they usually are, it means jury
trials.

As a result, we always have to keep a bit of

a restraint on policymaking through the antitrust laws
because it’s so easy to lose control of where
antitrust can go.
Now, what are the changes I think we need to
make?
First and foremost, I think we need to
change our basic presumption about efficiencies.
Robert Bork believed that efficiencies were incapable
of individualized proof, but he simply presumed that
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the vast majority of actions challenged as
anticompetitive, other than naked cartels, were in
fact motivated by efficiencies.
Well, our measurement tools are much better
today, particularly thanks to decades of merger
enforcement.

I think that presumption needs to be

weakened very considerably, and that means a couple of
things.

That means that we need lower standards for

prima facie cases, particularly with respect to
exclusionary practices and mergers.

And then, if

efficiencies are required — that is, if a prima facie
case has been met — then we really do have to put
teeth into the requirement that efficiencies be
proven.
I think the error of Ohio v. American
Express was that the Court was way too lenient with
respect to making out a prima facie case, because I
suspect that if the burden had ever shifted, AMEX
would not have been able to document the efficiencies
that it was claiming.
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Secondly, we need to take the labor problem
a whole lot more seriously.

I think everybody on the

panel has acknowledge it in some form.
has not kept up.

Wage growth

There are fixes we could be making.

First of all, I think the consumer welfare
principle needs to be rethought of more as affecting
output rather than price; that is, the goal of the
antitrust laws should be maximum output consistent
with sustainable competition, and that should serve to
squeeze down the margins between prices and costs.

It

also solves the problem that of course laborers as
sellers of labor are not really consumers, but they
are certainly under the umbrella of groups that we
want to protect under the consumer welfare principle.
More specifically, are there things we can
do with respect to labor?

Yeah.

One of them is to go

more aggressively against mergers that have a negative
impact in labor markets.

Mr. Delrahim has already

suggested that possibility.
quite a bit.
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I have had quite an education myself in the
last ten years about both the size and the mobility of
laborers and labor markets.

Concentration in labor

markets is higher, with higher concentration in many
product markets, and as a result we should be using
antitrust more aggressively to go after mergers that
tend to reduce the opportunities of labor and in the
process suppress wages to infracompetitive levels.
That, by the way, means that we will go
after certain mergers that don’t look horizontal
because we’re so fixated on product markets.

For

example, just about a year ago, the California State
Attorney General got a consent decree against a nopoaching agreement between eBay and Intuit.
Well, eBay and Intuit don’t compete in any
product markets to speak of, other than eBay selling
an occasional copy of TurboTax or something.

But they

agreed with each other not to hire or poach one
another’s computer engineers.
Well, we think of a relevant market as a
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collusive group.

What that tells me is that when we

start looking at mergers we need to spend some time in
addition looking and asking the question whether a
merger is horizontal.

We want to know not only where

and what products the company sells; we also want to
know what kinds of people it hires.

We need to be

more conscious of that.
The other area is noncompetition agreements.
We have always had this high theory about employee
noncompetition agreements.

They are used to protect

trade secrets, customer lists, and things like that.
Two recent refusals-to-dismiss complaints —
I think one was a summary judgment — were against
Jimmy John’s and McDonald’s.

The Jimmy John’s one

made kind of a feeble attempt to say “Well, there were
some trade secrets here because our employees cut the
head lettuce in a certain way” or something.
But the fact is these were global with
respect to those firms’ anti-noncompete agreements
that effectively forbade the franchisers of those
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companies to hire one another’s employees.

Of course,

the result would be lack of employee mobility and
reduced wages.

I think that’s another area where we

could get much more serious.
Finally, we need to deal with the
concentration problem, although I would add an
important caveat that most of the people at Open
Markets, for example, have not added.

That is, we

need to continue to try to establish links between
concentration and performance.

That is, we don’t go

after concentration for its own sake; we go after
concentration when it results in lower output, higher
prices, or some other effect that we can brand as
noncompetitive.

That may mean that in certain cases

we do allow fairly large firms, but we do need to take
the concentration problem more seriously.
I think the worst thing antitrust policy can
do today is just stick its head in the sand and say,
“We’re going to ignore these problems.”

I think some

compromise and working out will give us the kind of
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soft landing that the Clayton Act gave us a century
ago.
PROF. FOX:

Thank you all.

There is a certain amount of consensus on
the panel. There are losers from competition that
aren’t taken well care of within competition law or
even society as a whole.

Another theme of the panel

has been that our competition law in the United States
is based on premises about market power and
efficiencies that may not be true.
I want to do two things right now.

First of

all, I want to ask the panel: are there solutions you
want to propose that you have not yet proposed?
Then, second of all, are the proposed
solutions likely to satisfy the people who identify as
populists, or are the solutions marginal; working
within the system and just making our competition law
a little better? Will that satisfy the people who say,
“We’re really left out; the markets aren’t working for
us?”
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Frédéric, maybe you can go first on any
proposed solutions that haven’t been mentioned yet.
PROF. JENNY:

Yes.

First of all, I completely agree with what
Herb said.
avoid.

I think that there are two things to

The first one is to ignore the problem

completely.
The second one I would say is to jump to the
conclusion that the antitrust standard has to be
changed, that fairness has to be included in it.

The

reason for this is that I think that the populist or
the antiestablishment perspective is not so much to be
against the principle of competition, but more against
the fact that the way it has developed it is seen as
unfair.

That is what we have to fix.

It’s not so

much the theory; it’s more the practice of it.
On what Joe Stiglitz said — concentration,
common ownership, increasing margins, etc., etc. — I
think we have to be a bit careful.

There is a lot of

interesting work which is being done.
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can be translated into a rule of law — at this point
it’s a bit premature.

There is quite a bit of

controversy on, as you mentioned, whether the margins
are very high or increasing because there is more
technological innovation or because there’s more naked
abuse of market power.

It is still not very clear.

So I would be cautious there.
But it seems to me that competition
authorities, if they want to regain the trust of
people and stop meeting with each other all the time
everywhere to reassure each other — this is what they
do, and I participate in this — I’m absolutely struck
by the fact that they have a very limited notion of
the scope of the advocacy that they give.
It is quite clear that if there is anything
that will make competition work better for consumers
but is not directly the implementation of competition
law — such as, for example, increasing the mobility of
people by having a more-efficient educational system
that will give better skills to people, or having a
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system that will allow people to not lose all their
investment when they have to move from one region
which is depressed to another, etc., etc.
I don’t see that competition authorities
address in their advocacy function a number of things
that might make competition much more acceptable.

I

think that we have the duty, or we should have the
duty, to expand the scope of our advocacy.
The second thing — but Herb has talked about
it so I am not going to go through it — is to give
more attention to the labor implication of mergers or
others.
From that point of view — I will come back
to it in a second — it is clear that South Africa is
an interesting experience.

For some mergers — if you

think about the Walmart/Massmart merger, for example,
in South Africa — one of the ideas which prevailed was
the fact that “Well, there are a lot of people who
might be displaced.

I am going to put conditions

which are going to facilitate the transition (a) by
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the creation of a fund, (b) by having Walmart commit
to securing from the local producer for a while before
they change.”

I am not discussing the wisdom of this.

But the spirit of it is to say, “Okay, competition in
this case will mean that there is going to be a labor
problem, but maybe there are remedies that I can think
of that are going to make this labor remedy more
acceptable.”
The third one — I’m sorry to come back to
this because it fell on deaf ears — reading the
literature of behavioral economists is extremely
interesting on the area of fairness.

In particular,

when you read the work of Kahneman and Thaler, you see
that through experiments they are able to get to the
kind of fairness that people have in mind.
You find that one could use this —
competition authorities could use this — to pick among
all the possible anticompetitive practices or
transactions that they have in front of them those
that appeal more to the sense of fairness of people.
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If we are going to have prioritization, in any case we
have to find criteria for picking the cases which are
both anticompetitive, without changing the standard,
but which also seem to be particularly unfair.
I’ll give you just one example.

One of the

interesting things that comes out of this work is the
fact that people in general, the vast majority, find
that an increase in price by suppliers following an
increase in their own cost is not necessarily unfair,
but an increase in price which is not justified by an
increase in cost is mostly seen as being unfair.
Okay.
What does that tell us?

Well, if we have

two cases, a case of a cartel to pass on an increase
in the price of gas or something and another cartel
which is a naked cartel to increase prices, between
the two one of them is going to be perceived as
“really unfair and it’s good that the competition
authority went after it,” and the other one as “maybe
it was anticompetitive, but it’s not so valuable from

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

51

the point of view of fairness.”
This is one tiny example, but there are a
number of practical implications of the concept of
fairness that people have in mind.

Without changing

the metrics but by using prioritization principles to
make competition work for consumers, or to make
competition seem to work, one can choose first the
cases that are most problematic.
From that point of view, I would say that
the European Commission does that.
mentioned the Apple case.

Mario has already

One thing about the

increase in price of medicine by hundreds of times,
this is typically the case where you have a naked
increase in price that doesn’t seem to be justified by
any cost consideration, and which seems to be
particularly unfair.

The treatment of Mr. Shkreli in

the United States shows that clearly people thought
that he was being unfair.
There is value in choosing the
anticompetitive practices which are unfair.
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PROF. FOX:

Thank you.

Provocative again.

Time is running short, so I want to ask Joe
a short question and then turn to the audience.
Joe, you gave us some very specific
practical ways that antitrust law could, let’s say, be
rejiggered.

But your big point was huge, to really

move the envelope in a big way for reconceiving what
is market power. Is that possible? Or is it just a
fanciful idea given where we are?
PROF. STIGLITZ:

Yes, I think it is

possible, although I don’t think one should
necessarily keep away from aspirational ideas either.
But I think it actually is practical.
If you go back to the kind of idea that’s in
the Merger Guidelines, the power to raise price — can
you raise the price over marginal cost — and you ask
any change in merger acquisition, whether it’s
vertical or horizontal, you could ask — it may be hard
to answer but you could ask — does it affect the power
to raise price?
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To conclude, I really like what Herb said:
it’s not only the power to raise prices, but the power
to depress wages.
dimensions.

It’s market power in any of its

It’s the power to impose a contract

provision that would not be in the individual’s
rational interest to accept other than as a result of
market power.
So, I think it is an idea that can be
implemented.
This goes back to a remark that was made.
We’ve always used market share as an indirect
indicator of whether there is that market power.

But

now we often have the case where we can actually
ascertain whether there is market power and we
shouldn’t necessarily have to filter this through the
lens of market share.
I want to make one other point very briefly,
which is much of the analysis in economics in
antitrust is very static in nature and is not dynamic,
and yet society is really concerned with the long run.
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You see these concerns arise in fairness and they
question whether the competition authorities are
promoting competition.
If Walmart had come into South Africa
without the compensatory measures that they took,
there would have been less competition.

At least

South African producers would have been driven out of
business, they would have been able to buy the goods
from China using their monopsony power, and an
ordinary person looking at this would ask, “How is
this promoting competition when it is driving out
South African producers?”
The same thing.

There is an increasing

concern, I think, about preemptive mergers in the tech
field.

They look at the conditions today and they

say, “Well, this little pipsqueak today is not really
changing market share as it is today.”

But if every

time somebody who has the potential to come up is
bought in a preemptive merger by Google or one of the
other tech giants, there never will be competition.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

55

I think we have to think more explicitly
about the dynamics.

That, of course, was what

Microsoft was trying to head off in some of its
measures.

But there are new techniques now for trying

to avoid competition in the future.
PROF. FOX:

Let’s turn to the audience and

see what questions and comments you have.

Who would

like to be the first to intervene?
QUESTION:

Maxime Fischer-Zernin from Axinn,

Veltrop & Harkrider.
I have a question for Professor Hovenkamp.
You talked about shifting the consumer welfare
standard from price to output.

I was wondering how

you would define the welfare standard as it is used
today in the courts and what do you think would be the
effects of that shift towards output and whether it
can be done in the current framework?
PROF. HOVENKAMP:

First of all, the modern

consumer welfare standard as we use it today looks
only at the welfare of consumers, not of producers.
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That’s the difference between the current version and
Bork’s version forty years ago.
Focusing on output rather than price is kind
of a rhetorical issue because when output goes up
price goes down.

But it meets this objection that you

so often hear from the Neo-Brandeisians, that a
consumer welfare standard doesn’t protect labor
because laborers aren’t consumers; as laborers they’re
sellers.
If you think of the consumer welfare
standard in terms of output, you want markets that are
competitive on both the buying side and the seller
side so that every unit of either labor or product is
being sold for its marginal productive value.

I think

that gets you closer to an articulable goal.
Now, I’m not saying it’s going to be always
that easy to apply, but at least we want markets that
are competitive on the labor side as well as the
product side.
PROF. FOX:
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PROF. STIGLITZ:
be properly defined.

First of all, output has to

So, for instance, if you have a

set of arrangements that allow effectively a tax on
cash transactions to subsidize credit card
transactions and you narrowly define output as credit
card transactions, credit card sales could go up, but
it’s not the total number of transactions that has
gone up, and you have distorted the market in a very
important way.
One of the problems in some recent decisions
is that they have looked at output in the wrong way.
There are broader what we would call general
equilibrium effects where, for instance, if you drive
down wages from monopoly power and the result of that
is that people work harder and as a result of that
output goes up, that’s not a good thing.
So, output needs to be understood in terms
of a very broad welfare construct.
PROF. FOX:

Panelists, would you confine any

changes to price or output. What about labor? Do your
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solutions take in the big concerns of the losers?

Is

antitrust more than price and output?
PROF. STIGLITZ:

I think you have to look at

how the overall economic system works.

Now, this goes

to what you might say is the difference between when I
said aspirational and actually implementable.
I think that it ought to be of concern that
if you had an economic arrangement the losers of which
are poor people, then I think that’s a consideration
that one ought to take into account.
PROF. FOX:

And that’s distributional to

poor people?
PROF. STIGLITZ:

That’s right.

It

reinforces — I don’t want to say it’s the only thing,
but I think it should be a factor that tilts the
balance in how you are looking at how this competitive
system is working.
system.

Because it’s not a competitive

We are changing the balance as bargaining

powers, and when the outcome of this is not only lower
output but also more inequity, I think we should be
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more compelled to take action.
PROF. FOX:

I’m going to call on Mario now,

but if anyone wants to make a comment or ask a
question, just go up to the microphone.

We’ll have

time for one more, maybe two more.
Mario, go ahead.
PROF. MONTI:

We heard a number of ways in

which competition policy could address populist
concerns.
panel.

I have a question for the rest of the

To me, Fordham, which I first attended in the

year 2000, has been and is the symbol of convergence.
Are we perhaps heading to a situation where
there will be some conflict between two worthwhile
objectives (1) addressing concerns raised by populists
and (2) international convergence, further convergence
in competition policy?
Some of the solutions we heard seemed to be
rather country-specific, social system-specific,
structure-specific.

Much of the progress in

convergence over the last twenty years was achieved as
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we moved — and certainly from the European side we had
to move quite a bit — towards a more abstract and
general principle, that of consumer welfare.
So, are we going to have to make a choice
between a more populist, resilient competition policy
and a more globally coordinated competition policy?
PROF. FOX:

Great question. Are there

tradeoffs; how big are the tradeoffs?
Before your answers, let’s take the last
question from the floor. Then I want to give each of
you only one minute to say what you wish.

It can be

in response to Mario’s question, the new question,
whatever.

We only have four more minutes.
QUESTION:

My name is Michael Cragg.

I’m

Chairman of The Brattle Group.
I’m curious what the panel’s view is in
terms of U.S. competition policy whether the Supreme
Court’s decision in AMEX, which emphasized indirect
network effects and the economics of platforms,
provides sufficient impetus to examine the dynamic
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effects that Professor Stiglitz spoke to and whether
it addresses the new economy in a way that allows for
regulation or abuses; or does Congress have to take
action to provide more guidance as to how we think
about the digital economy?
PROF. FOX:

Thank you.

Herb, let’s start with you and go down the
line.
PROF. HOVENKAMP:
PROF. FOX:

On AMEX or on anything?

On AMEX or anything.

PROF. HOVENKAMP:

One sentence on each.

First of all, I am very frustrated when I
read things like Barry Lynn of Open Markets — I agree
with him that there are many, many economic problems
in the country regarding distribution of wealth, the
plight of laborers, and so on — but very little
recognition that antitrust has any institutional
limits.

He seems to believe we can use antitrust to

kind of rewrite the economy without having any more
explicit judgment.
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AMEX is such an economic nightmare that I
don’t think it is going to be a useful guide for
anything, although I do fear it is going to cost
thousands of hours of litigation deciding when to put
both sides of a platform into the same market.

So, I

hesitate to predict so much.
My guess is that AMEX is going to go the way
of Image Tech v. Kodak, if you all are familiar with
that decision, which is that the courts bent over
backwards in the subsequent ten years to construe it
as narrowly as possible in order to limit the amount
of damage that it could do.

The result was that Image

Tech never had all that much traction in the antitrust
courts.

I hope and pray that that ends up being the

case with AMEX as well.
PROF. FOX:
PROF. JENNY:

Frédéric?
First of all, I’m extremely

happy that I don’t think that anybody on the panel
said we should just ignore the problem as we have done
in the past.

Everybody said, “Well, the
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distributional impact of competition may have some
importance.”
In answer to Mario, I would say that among
the things I suggested there are some that don’t
create the possibility of a conflict.

If it’s a

question of advocacy for the competition authority or
the way it prioritizes cases, that’s entirely its
freedom, and it doesn’t necessarily raise an issue.
Once one gets into taking into account the
labor implication of a merger, there is more risk
there.

But I think that the important step is to say,

“Well, maybe we’re not quite ready to go there at this
point.”
First of all, the experience of South Africa
has shown that at the time there was a lot of anxiety
over the Walmart case, but ex post everybody seems to
say it was a pretty good idea.

So, time will help us

solve those problems.
I think where we would really have a problem
— and is kind of the thing which is agitated by some —
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is to say, “Let’s include fairness as one of the
criteria of anticompetitive practices.”

I think that

we are nowhere near that and that we stay away from
this, but this doesn’t mean ignoring the problem.
PROF. FOX:

Thank you.

Joe?
PROF. STIGLITZ:

First, on the Supreme

Court, I think it illustrates that economics is more
complicated than a lot of people understand and giving
what was a very difficult economic case to a
particular jurist may not have been a good idea.
The economics literature actually has only
addressed how two-sided markets work in the presence
of monopoly.

It actually hasn’t really addressed

competition in two-sided markets.

So, they didn’t

really have a lot to draw upon, but what they had to
draw upon they clearly got totally wrong.
The underlying economics — it’s sort of like
some legislatures in the United States have legislated
that pi should be 3.0 because it’s too complicated to
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remember that it’s 3.1416.

Well, if you make law like

that, you’re going to have trouble squaring a circle.
There are certain things where if you don’t
get the economics right you are clearly going to get
the law wrong.
PROF. FOX:
PROF. MONTI:
after so many years.
long.

Mario?
It’s impressive to be here
It’s so many but it’s not that

In the year 2000 we didn’t have any beginning

of the International Competition Network (ICN) yet; we
just commented on the statements of Joel Klein one
week before about the possibility of some multilateral
initiative.

We didn’t have in Europe a distributed

system like the European Competition Network (ECN)
now.
Maybe the family of competition should slow
down its recent progress because it is too difficult
to follow.
PROF. FOX:

Thank you all.

We’ll think

seriously about the 3.0 effect and populism in
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general.

I’m sure we’ll have many more conversations.
Join with me to thank the panelists.
MR. KEYTE:

Good job.

Thank you very much.

I’ll make the one observation that if you
actually read Article 102, it has the word “fairness”
in it still.
PROF. FOX:

Yes.

MR. KEYTE:

So maybe they need to do

something there.

But I think the common-law tradition

in the United States might require some statutory
changes for these very important objectives.
Let’s come back in a little over an hour, an
hour and ten minutes or so, and we’ll have a panel on
“Vertical Restraints — Convergence or Divergence?” —
just an incredible panel, and highly, highly topical.
Thank you so much.
[Adjourned:

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

12:40 p.m.]

